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FLORIDA REVERSES ITS PER SE REVERSAL RULE ON
IMPROPER PROSECUTORIAL COMMENT ON A
DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS TO REMAIN SILENT
J. ALLISON DEFOOR II* AND RANDOLPH BRACCIALARGHE**
I. INTRODUCTION
A police officer took the stand in a Florida court and was asked
by the prosecutor whether the defendant made any post-Miranda
warning statements.' The officer responded, "I asked him, but he
refused to give me any information."2 Until very recently, depend-
ing on whether the trial was in federal or state court, the effect of
such a comment would have been radically different. In state
court, the comment probably would have resulted in an immediate
mistrial, and, had it not, would have required reversal on appeal
regardless of the strength of the evidence against the defendant.
Such a result was mandated by the longstanding Florida rule that
comment by the state on a defendant's exercise of his right to re-
main silent was per se reversible error. In federal court, such a
comment was seen as curable under the harmless error rule. After
years of deliberation and vacillation, the Florida Supreme Court
recently adopted the federal approach in the case of State v.
DiGuilio. 3
The former Florida rule had been under increasing attack. By
* Judge of the 16th Judicial Circuit in and for Monroe County, Florida (The Florida
Keys). Adjunct Professor, University of Miami Department of Sociology and School of Law.
University of South Florida, B.A.; Stetson University of College of Law, J.D.
** Assistant Professor of Law, Nova University Center for the Study of Law. University
of Michigan, A.B.; University of Miami, J.D. Portions of this article are adapted from
DeFoor, Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument, 7 NOVA L.J. 443 (1983).
1. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. This scenario is taken from Rowell v. State, 450 So. 2d 1226 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984),
quashed, 476 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 1985), and is apparently a common occurence. See, e.g., White
v. State, 377 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 845 (1980); Chance v. State, 363
So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1978); Trafficante v. State, 92 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 1957); Simmons v. State, 190
So. 756 (Fla. 1939); Rowe v. State, 98 So. 613 (Fla. 1924); Jackson v. State, 34 So. 243 (Fla.
1903); see generally Cain, Sensational Prosecutions and Reversals, 7 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1
(1932); DeFoor, Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument, 7 NOVA L.J. 443 (1983);
Padovano, Prejudicial Comments of the Prosecutor During Closing Argument, 51 FLA. B.J.
159 (March 1977); Vess, Walking a Tightrope: A Survey of the Limitations on the Prosecu-
tor's Closing Argument, 64 J. CraM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 22 (1973); Note, The Nature and
Consequences of Forensic Misconduct in the Prosecution of a Criminal Case, 54 COLUM. L.
REV. 946 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Forensic Misconduct]; Note, Adverse Comments by a
Florida Prosecutor Upon a Defendant's Failure to Testify, 15 U. MIAMI L. REV. 293 (1961);
Note, Prosecutor Forensic Misconduct-"Harmless Error?" 6 UTAH L. REV. 108 (1958).
3. 10 Fla. L.W. 430 (Fla. August 29, 1985), petition for reh'g filed, No. 65,490 (Fla. Sept.
13, 1985).
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1984, two district courts of appeal had certified questions to the
supreme court asking, in substance, whether Florida should aban-
don its per se rule in such cases. The Fifth District Court of Ap-
peal addressed the issue as follows:
The state poses the question: Why should a mere, unintentional
slip of the tongue by a State's witness . . . doom an otherwise
proper and lawful conviction to certain reversal despite ironclad
testimony and physical and circumstantial evidence which pro-
vide unequivocal and uncontroverted proof of the accused's guilt?
Indeed, this is a difficult question to answer from the standpoint
of reason and logic. Perhaps it can only be answered by the acrid
and familiar comment on the law by Mr. Bumble in Oliver Twist.
Or perhaps more fairly by the observation that bad precedents
often derive from noble motives. In any event, the state's ques-
tion would be more appropriately directed to the Florida Su-
preme Court than to us.4
II. DEVELOPMENT OF EARLY FLORIDA LAW
The evolution of Florida law on improper prosecutorial comment
can only be described as curious. From its inception, Florida's Con-
stitution has contained a prohibition against compelling a witness
to testify against himself 5 Florida courts further adhered to the
mirror-image of this protection 6-the defendant was generally con-
sidered incompetent to testify on his own behalf.7 Beginning in
1864 with the State of Maine, there was a nationwide erosion of the
common law rule that a criminal defendant was incompetent to
testify in his own behalf.8 By 1865, whether a criminal defendant
4. Rowell, 450 So. 2d at 1228.
5. FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. I, § 10. The same basic provision was retained in subsequent
constitutions. FLA. CONST. of 1861, art. I, § 10; FLA. CONST. of 1865, art. I, § 10; FLA. CONST. of
1868, art. I, § 8; FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. I, § 12. The provision in the 1968 revision to the
constitution of 1885 provides that "[n]o person shall be ... compelled in any criminal mat-
ter to be a witness against himself." FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
6. Miller v. State, 15 Fla. 577, 583 (1875). It is clear that a defendant had the right to
address the jury as counsel in his own cause, but unclear whether he could do so as co-
counsel with his lawyer. See generally DeFoor, Lewis & Mitchell, The Right to Dual Repre-
sentation, 18 Hous. L. REy. 519 (1981); DeFoor & Mitchell, Hybrid Representation: An
Analysis of a Criminal Defendant's Right to Participate as Co-Counsel at Trial, 10 STET-
SON L. REV. 191 (1981).
7. See generally J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 579 (Chadbourn Rev. 1979).
8. For an excellent discussion of the history of this erosion, see Ferguson v. Georgia, 365
U.S. 570 (1961). In Ferguson, the Court concluded that Georgia's adherence to the incompe-
tency doctrine was unconstitutional, finding a right in the United States Constitution for
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could testify in his own behalf in Florida was a matter of judicial
discretion,9 and, in 1870, defendants were given a statutory right to
make a sworn statement to the jury.'0 This right was broadened by
the legislature in 1895 to make criminal defendants subject to all
the rules applicable to other witnesses." The statute further pro-
vided protection to defendants by precluding the prosecution from
commenting upon a defendant's silence if he chose not to take the
stand. 2 This protection, earlier afforded by statute, is now ex-
tended by the nearly identical provisions of Rule 3.250 of the Flor-
ida Rules of Criminal Procedure.13
Once the defendant became a permissible witness and the prose-
cution was precluded from commenting on the defendant's silence,
three new issues arose. First, what constitutes an impermissible
comment upon a defendant's right to remain silent? Second, as-
suming an impermissible comment is made, is contemporaneous
objection required in order to preserve the point for appeal? Fi-
nally, and most fundamentally, what is the appropriate remedy
when an impermissible prosecutorial comment on the defendant's
right to remain silent is made? Is reversal always mandated, or is
there room for application of the harmless error rule?
the defendant to testify. The Georgia statute was repealed, although, curiously, Georgia re-
tained in its statutes a right for a criminal defendant to make an unsworn statement to-the
jury in lieu of testimony. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 38-415, 27-405 (1974).
9. Miller, 15 Fla. at 583.
10. See Law of June 1, 1870, ch. 1816, 1870 Fla. Laws 13; Hancock v. State, 85 So. 142,
143-44 (Fla. 1920) (Browne, C.J., dissenting).
11. Law of May 30, 1895, ch. 4400, § 1, 1895 Fla. Laws 162 provided:
Accused May Make Himself a Witness: In all criminal prosecutions the accused
may at his option be sworn as a witness in his own behalf, and shall in such case
be subject to examination as other witnesses, but no accused person shall be com-
pelled to give testimony against himself, nor shall any prosecuting attorney be
permitted before the court or jury to comment on the failure of the accused to
testify in his own behalf.
See also Hart v. State, 20 So. 805 (Fla. 1896) (noting that prior to this law the accused could
make statements under oath relating to matters of his defense and at the same time not
become a witness or subject to the rules governing witnesses).
12. Law of May 30, 1895, ch. 4400, 1895 Fla. Laws 162 eventually came to be codified at
FLA. STAT. § 918.091 (1958). See Ratiner, Adverse Comments by a Florida Prosecutor upon
a Defendant's Failure to Testify, 15 U. MIAMI L. REV. 293, 295 n.12 (1961).
13. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.250 provides:
Accused as Witness. In all criminal prosecutions the accused may at his option be
sworn as a witness in his own behalf, and shall in such case be subject to examina-
tion as other witnesses, but no accused person shall be compelled to give testi-
mony against himself, nor shall any prosecuting attorney be permitted before the
jury or court to comment on the failure of the accused to testify in his own behalf,
and a defendant offering no testimony in his own behalf, except his own, shall be
entitled to the concluding argument before the jury.
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III. NATURE OF COMMENT
Analysis of the law concerning improper prosecutorial comment
has been hampered by the failure of appellate courts to define pre-
cisely what constitutes an impermissible comment on a defendant's
silence. The impropriety of a comment is not affected by how inad-
vertent or indirect14 the comment might be, or by a prosecutor's
denial of any "intent" to comment on a defendant's right.'5 If the
comment is fairly susceptible of an interpretation that brings it
within the rule requiring per se reversal, it is so construed, regard-
less of its susceptibility of a differing construction.'" Indeed, the
types of prosecutorial comment which courts have found to merit
reversal have ranged from the egregious 17 to the subtle.18 The same
rule applies to a comment by a prosecutor about the failure of a
co-defendant to testify.' 9 It does not, however, extend to such a
comment by a co-defendant's counsel.20
Not all comments relating to a defendant's post-Miranda silence
are cause for reversal. Much confusion has resulted from a prose-
cutor's characterization of his case as "uncontroverted" or "unex-
plained" in cases where the defendant did not testify. Prosecutors
began using this double entendre soon after they were prohibited
from directly commenting on a defendant's silence.21 For a long
14. Flaherty v. State, 183 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966). But see Helton v. State, 424
So. 2d 137 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
15. Trafficante v. State, 92 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 1957); Milton v. State, 127 So. 2d 460 (Fla.
2d DCA 1961).
16. Harris v. State, 438 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 1983); Rowe v. State, 98 So. 613, 618 (Fla. 1924);
Jackson v. State, 34 So. 243 (Fla. 1903). The rule may be stated as follows: If the prosecu-
tor's comment is "fairly susceptible of being interpreted by the jury as a statement to the
effect that an 'innocent man would attempt to explain the circumstances but the defendant
offered no such explanation . . .' then the comment thus interpreted or construed violated
the prohibition of the rule." David v. State, 369 So. 2d 943, 944 (Fla. 1979) (quoting David
v. State, 348 So. 2d 420, 421 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973) (Mager, J., dissenting)).
17. See David, 369 So. 2d at 944. The defense attorney apparently had hypothesized a
defense predicated upon a business failure. The prosecutor argued the permissible line:
"Where is the evidence," see infra notes 64-74 and accompanying text, but went on to pose
the impermissible rhetorical question, "If he had a business failure, why didn't he say any-
thing . . .?" David, 369 So. 2d at 944 (emphasis omitted). The conviction was reversed.
18. See Hall v. State, 364 So. 2d 866, 867 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (where the prosecutor
referred to the defense counsel's attempt to shift the focus of the case from the defendant,
whom he characterized as sitting there "quietly").
19. Clouser v. State, 152 So. 2d 200, 201 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963); Harper v. State, 151 So. 2d
881, 883 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963).
20. Jenkins v. State, 317 So. 2d 114, 115 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Smith v. State, 238 So. 2d
120, 121 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970). But see Cruz v. State, 328 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). See
generally Annot., 1 A.L.R. 3d 989 (1965).
21. Gray v. State, 28 So. 53 (Fla. 1900).
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while such comments were allowed on the theory that they were
comments on the evidence, not a defendant's silence.22 The trend
then began to run the other way, culminating in a holding by the
Second District that "when the defendant elects not to testify, it is
error to refer to the State's evidence as being unexplained or un-
contradicted, or undenied .... ,23
The Florida Supreme Court later allowed such comment in two
cases where the defense counsel advanced theories of coerced con-
fession 24 and insanity without the defendant's testimony.25 Then,
in the case of White v. State,28 the Third District held that such
comments were permissible as comments on the evidence when the
testimony of several witnesses had been heard.27 This approach
was approved by the Florida Supreme Court, which cited the ear-
lier line of cases allowing such comment.28 Subsequently, the Fifth
District, in Smith v. State, 9 stated: "Indeed, if a prosecutor could
not make fair comment on the fact that the state's evidence of
guilt was uncontroverted, what would be left for him to argue in a
case where the defendant declined to testify?
30
In the Fourth District, the treatment given this type of comment
22. Id.; see also Clinton v. State, 47 So. 389 (1908).
23. Singleton v. State, 183 So. 2d 245, 252 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966) (citing Way v. State, 67
So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1953); Trafficante v. State, 92 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 1957)), overruled in part,
Craft v. State, 300 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974).
24. State v. Mathis, 278 So. 2d 280, 281 (Fla. 1973) ("Now did you hear one thing about
him getting beaten up or somebody was pounding on his head, forcing him into this?").
25. State v. Jones, 204 So. 2d 515, 516 (Fla. 1967) ("Now where is the evidence that he
says he didn't know what he was doing?").
26. 348 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
27. Id. at 369 ("You haven't heard one word of testimony to contradict what she [state's
witness] has said, other than the lawyer's argument.").
28. In White v. State, 377 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 845 (1980),
there was only one witness to the crimes, other than the defendant. In referring to
the testimony of the eye witness in closing argument, the prosecutor said, "You
haven't heard one word of testimony to contradict what she has said, other than
the lawyer's argument." ... Defendant objected to this statement and moved for
a mistrial. The motion for mistrial was denied and this ruling was affirmed by the
district court of appeal. It is proper for a prosecutor in closing argument to refer
to the evidence as it exists before the jury and to point out that there is an ab-
sence of evidence on a certain issue. . . .It is thus firmly embedded in the juris-
prudence of this state that a prosecutor may comment on the uncontradicted or
uncontroverted nature of the evidence during argument to the jury.
377 So. 2d at 1150 (citing State v. Mathis, 278 So.2d 280 (Fla. 1973); State v. Jones, 204 So.
2d at 516-517; Clinton v. State, 47 So. 389 (Fla. 1908); Gray v. State, 28 So. 53 (1900);
Mabery v. State, 303 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); Woodside v. State, 206 So. 2d 426 (Fla.
3d DCA 1968)).
29. 378 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 5th DCA), aff'd, 394 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 1980).
30. Id. at 314.
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may well have depended on which panel heard the case. In Mar-
shall v. State,31 the court found a similar comment impermissi-
ble. 32 Judge Glickstein, concurring in Crawford v. State,33 attrib-
uted the Marshall result to the workings of the district court
"which by its mode of operation is balkanized into diverse panels
of three or majorities thereof." 4 He criticized the Marshall deci-
sion as factually indistinguishable from the supreme court's deci-
sion in White"5 and a previous decision of the same district in
Lampkin v. State.36
In light of the positions taken by the courts in White,37 Bud-
man,3 8 and Smith3" on the one hand, and in Marshall and the
older cases of Singleton ° and Trafficante1 on the other, there re-
mains confusion as to the parameters of acceptable prosecutorial
comment on "unrefuted evidence" and the like."2 May such a com-
ment be advanced at all times, or only where it may be seen as a
31. 473 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 4th DCA), quashed, 476 So.2d 150 (Fla. 1985).
32. "[Tlhe only person you heard from in this courtroom with regard to the events of
[the day in question) was ... [the victim]." Id.
33. 473 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985).
34. Id. at 702 (Glickstein, J., concurring specially).
35. White v. State, 377 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 1979).
36. 445 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). Judge Glickstein stated in Crawford, 473 So. 2d
at 702:
Although the [Lampkin) opinion does not recite the prosecutor's comments, the
briefs reflect that the prosecutor said: "There's only been one version of facts
given from that chair right there and B.R. Johnson (policeman) made that version
and said the gun was in the middle of the seat." The defendant was the only
person other than the policeman who could have testified as to the location of the
gun.
The Supreme Court should be aware of these two cases in its consideration of
Marshall and of the instant case. I fail to see how Marshall differs from White or
Lampkin, but it represents the opinion of this court ....
37. White v. State, 348 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), approved in pertinent part, 377
So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 1979).
38. Budman v. State, 362 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), aff'd, 394 So. 2d 407 (Fla.
1980).
39. Smith v. State, 378 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
40. Singleton v. State, 183 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966), overruled in part, Craft v.
State, 300 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974).
41. Trafficante v. State, 92 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 1957).
42. The Florida Supreme Court has expressly permitted prosecutorial reference to "un-
refuted" evidence. State v. Sheperd, 10 Fla. L.W. 609 (Fla. Nov. 25, 1985). The court stated:
In order to clarify exactly when a comment is "fairly susceptible" of being inter-
preted by the jury as referring to the defendant's failure to testify, we hold that a
prosecutorial comment in reference to the defense generally as opposed to the
defendant individually cannot be "fairly susceptible" of being interpreted by the
jury as referring to the defendant's failure to testify.
Id. at 610 (emphasis in original).
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comment on the evidence rather than on the defendant's silence?
The language of the Fifth District in Smith43 and Elam v. State"
and the supreme court's decision in White suggest the former,
while the original Third District opinion in the White case sug-
gests the latter.'5
There are several directions in which the Florida courts may go
in clarifying this point of law.4" Some jurisdictions allow such com-
ments if they appear to refer to a witness other than the defend-
ant.47 Florida courts already allow comment that the defendant did
not provide a witness that he reasonably could have been expected
to provide. 8 Courts in other jurisdictions would seem to allow this
line of argument 49 even when the defendant would be the only wit-
ness who could reasonably be expected to refute the evidence.50
Aside from the need of the Fourth District to internally reconcile
its views, the supreme court needs to elucidate whether it intended
to overrule Singleton and Trafficante and to clarify the exact pa-
rameters of improper prosecutorial comment.
43. Smith v. State, 378 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
44. 389 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
45. 348 So. 2d at 369. The court said:
In referring to the testimony of the eyewitness, the prosecuting attorney said,
"You haven't heard one word of testimony to contradict what she has said, other
than the lawyer's argument." If the evidence presented a situation where the only
person who could have contradicted the witness's testimony was the defendant
himself, then this comment might be interpreted as the defendant suggests. We
hold that in this case, where the testimony of several witnesses was heard and
there was nothing in the testimony to show that the defendant was not present at
the scene of the crime, that the statement by the state's attorney was a fair com-
ment upon the evidence.
46. See generally Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 723 (1967).
47. See, e.g., Desmond v. United States, 345 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1965). Cases like this fall
under the rubric announced in United States v. Bubar, 567 F.2d 192 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 872 (1977): "A constitutional violation occurs only if either the defendant alone has
the information to contradict the government evidence referred to or the jury naturally and
necessarily would interpret the summation as a comment on the failure of the accused to
testify." Id. at 199 (quoting United States ex rel. Leak v. Fallette, 418 F.2d 1266 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1050 (1970)); see also United States v. Riola, 694 F.2d 670
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1073 (1983); State v. Bolton, 383 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2d DCA
1980).
48. Buckrem v. State, 355 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 1978). The witness must be competent and
available. This is especially true if a witness is a spouse. Jenkins v. State, 317 So. 2d 90 (Fla.
1st DCA 1975).
49. For other forms the argument can take, see United States v. Giuliano, 383 F.2d 30
(3d Cir. 1967) ("unrefuted"); Ruiz v. United States, 365 F.2d 103 (10th Cir. 1966) ("uncon-
troverted"); State v. Hampton, 430 S.W.2d 160 (Mo. 1968) ("undenied").
50. See, e.g., People v. Stambeary, 261 N.E.2d 765 (Ill. 1970).
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IV. CONTEMPORANEOUS OBJECTION
The second issue to be addressed in an analysis of improper
prosecutorial comment is whether contemporaneous objection to
the comment is required. As with the issue of what constitutes an
impermissible comment, the courts have vacillated on this point.
However, on the issue of contemporaneous objection, the courts
now take a uniform view.
When the issue was addressed in Simmons v. State51 in 1939,
the lack of a contemporaneous objection was held not to bar rais-
ing the issue on appeal. It was not until 1978 that Justice Alder-
man, writing in a special concurrence to Willinsky, called the Sim-
mons conclusion on contemporaneous objection into question. 2 In
the same year, in Clark v. State,53 Justice Alderman, this time
writing for the majority, directly addressed the point and stated
that improper comment on a defendant's right to remain silent was
not fundamental error. Thus, failure to object contemporaneously
waived the point on appeal:54
"Fundamental error," which can be considered on appeal without
objection in the lower court, is error which goes to the foundation
of the case or goes to the merits of the cause of action. An im-
proper comment on defendant's exercise of his right to remain
silent is constitutional error, but it is not fundamental error.5
Justice Adkins, who had authored Willinsky, dissented, decrying
what he saw as a retreat from the principles embodied in Sim-
mons. 5 The Clark holding persists, even though the courts have
held other, arguably less serious, instances of improper
prosecutorial comment fundamental and deemed them proper for
appellate review despite the absence of objection.5
V. THE APPROPRIATE SANCTION
A. History of the Florida Law
The third and final issue relevant to this inquiry is: What sanc-
51. 190 So. 756 (Fla. 1939).
52. 360 So. 2d at 763 (Alderman, J., concurring).
53. 363 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1978).
54. Id. at 334.
55. Id. at 333 (citing in comparison Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976); Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)).
56. Clark, 363 So. 2d at 335-36 (Adkins, J., dissenting).
57. See, e.g., Peterson v. State, 376 So. 2d 1230, 1234 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
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tions have accompanied violations of the prohibition against
prosecutorial comment upon a defendant's right to remain silent,
and, by extension, what sanction should accompany such a viola-
tion? The Florida Supreme Court has reversed its position on the
issue of sanction no fewer than six times. The initial Florida view,
indicated in dicta, was that, although unlikely, there "might" be
cases where such comment would not be reversible error.58 In 1939,
the supreme court in Simmons v. State" adopted the then minor-
ity view ° that such comment was incurable and not subject to the
harmless error rule. 1 In Simmons, the defendant took the stand
on his own behalf and the prosecutor sought to impeach him on
the basis of his failure to testify at a preliminary hearing, without
objection from the defense.2 The Simmons automatic reversal rule
guided Florida decisions on the issue until the 1967 case of State v.
Hines.6 3 In Hines and subsequent cases, the court deviated from
the Simmons rule, partly in response to intervening federal deci-
sions. Prior to completing our examination of the history and de-
velopment of Florida law on sanctions, it is necessary to examine
two significant federal developments and their impact on the state
law's development.
B. Development of the Federal Case Law
1. Fifth Amendment Applied to States
In 1893, the United States Supreme Court first addressed the
issue of improper prosecutorial comment in Wilson v. United
States,64 holding, like early Florida courts, that it was reversible
error to comment on the defendant's exercise of his fifth amend-
ment right to silence.6 5 After declining in Adamson v. California"6
58. Jackson v. State, 34 So. 243 (Fla. 1903).
59. 190 So. 756 (Fla. 1939).
60. See Ratiner, supra note 12, at 298; Note, Forensic Misconduct, supra note 2, at 960
n.68.
61. Simmons v. State, 190 So. 756, 757 (Fla. 1939).
62. Id.
63. State v. Hines, 195 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 1967).
64. 149 U.S. 60 (1893).
65. The prosecutorial comment made during closing argument in Wilson was:
I want to say to you, that if I am ever charged with crime, I will not stop by
putting witnesses on the stand to testify to my good character, but I will go upon
the stand and hold up my hand before high Heaven and testify to my innocence of
the crime.
Id. at 66. When the defense objected and the court suggested that counsel should not be
commenting on that subject, the prosecutor added: "I did not mean to refer to it in that
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to hold the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment appli-
cable to the states,6 7 the Supreme Court reversed itself in Malloy
v. Hogan6" and incorporated the fifth amendment through the
fourteenth amendment. 9
The next step was taken in Griffin v. California,70 in which the
Court applied the reversible error rule articulated in Wilson to the
states through the fourteenth amendment. The trial court in Grif-
fin followed a provision of the California Constitution71 and in-
structed the jury that the defendant had a constitutional right not
to testify. However, the court ruled that if the facts were within
the defendant's knowledge, the jury could consider the defendant's
light, and I do not intend to refer in a single word to the fact that he did not testify in his
own behalf." Id. at 67. The Court equated this rejoinder with:
You gentlemen of the jury know full well that an innocent man would have
gone on the stand and have testified to his innocence, but I do not mean to refer
to the fact that he did not, for it is a circumstance which you will take into consid-
eration without it.
Id. at 67.
66. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
67. In Adamson, the Court upheld a conviction under the same section of the California
Constitution permitting comment by court and counsel on a defendant's silence which the
Court later found objectionable in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). In declining to
incorporate the fifth amendment through the fourteenth, the Court touted the constitu-
tional doctrine of federalism and the preservation of "the balance between national and
state power." 332 U.S. at 53. In referring to that section of the California Constitution that
permitted comment upon the defendant's silence, the Court opined: "However sound may
be the legislative conclusion that an accused should not be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself, we see no reason why comment should not be made upon his
silence." Id. at 56.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter agreed with the majority on this point:
Only a technical rule of law would exclude from consideration that which is rele-
vant, as a matter of fair reasoning, to the solution of a problem. Sensible and just-
minded men, in important affairs of life, deem it significant that a man remains
silent when confronted with serious and responsible evidence against himself
which it is within his power to contradict. The notion that to allow jurors to do
that which sensible and right-minded men do every day violates the "immutable
principles of justice" as conceived by a civilized society is to trivialize the impor-
tance of "due process."
Id. at 60 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
68. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
69. MaUoy did not involve a prosecutor's comment; it involved a man's attempt to claim
the protection of the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination in a state court
proceeding. The state court found that the questions were not incriminating. The court "ad-
judged him in contempt, and committed him to prison until he was willing to answer the
questions." Id. at 3.
70. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
71. CAL. CONsT. art I, § 13 provides in part that "in any criminal case, whether the
defendant testifies or not, his failure to explain or deny by his testimony any evidence or
facts in the case against him may be commented upon by the court and by counsel, and may
be considered by the court or the jury."
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failure to explain evidence that he reasonably could be expected to
deny. 2 The prosecutor in Griffin had commented on the defend-
ant's failure to take the stand and deny the crime or explain facts
within his knowledge.7 3 In reversing Griffin's conviction, the Su-
preme Court held that in both federal and state trials the fifth
amendment forbids "either comment by the prosecution on the ac-
cused's silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evi-
dence of guilt. 74
2. Harmless Error Rule
The second significant federal development was the application
of the harmless error rule to a constitutional violation. The defend-
ant in Chapman v. California75 was convicted before the Court de-
cided Griffin. Like Griffin, Chapman was a California case involv-
ing state constitutionally-permitted comment by the court and the
prosecutor on the defendant's right to silence.76 Having the benefit
of Griffin, the California Supreme Court nevertheless affirmed
Chapman's conviction by applying the harmless error provision of
the state constitution.77 After determining that federal rather than
state law controlled,78 the United States Supreme Court reversed.
The Court, however, declined to hold all federal constitutional er-
rors harmful 7 9 noting that all fifty states had harmless error rules
which "serve a very useful purpose insofar as they block setting
aside convictions for small errors or defects that have little, if any,
likelihood of having changed the result of the trial."80
In fashioning a "harmless constitutional error rule,"8 the Court
72. 380 U.S. at 610.
73. Id. at 610-11.
74. Id. at 615.
75. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
76. Id. at 19, 26-42.
77. Id. at 20.
78.
The application of a state harmless-error rule is, of course, a state question where
it involves only errors of state procedure or state law. . . .Whether a conviction
for crime should stand when a State has failed to accord federal constitutionally
guaranteed rights is every bit as much of a federal question as what particular
federal constitutional provisions themselves mean, what they guarantee, and
whether they have been denied.
Id. at 21.
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looked to the standard annunciated in Fahy v. Connecticut82 and
held that "before a federal constitutional error can be held harm-
less, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt." 83
C. Florida Law After Incorporation of the Fifth Amendment
In 1967, contemporaneous with the emergence of the federal
harmless error rule, the Florida Supreme Court in State v. Hines84
directly and expressly receded from Simmons v. State,85 holding
that where a defendant took the stand, his failure to testify in a
prior hearing properly could be the subject of prosecutorial com-
ment.86 In the 1968 case of State v. Galasso,7 the court applied
the statutory harmless error rule88 to such a comment and the re-
versal of the Simmons doctrine was complete. Ten years later, in
Willinsky v. State,8 the court again changed direction when it re-
pudiated Galasso and expressly reinstated the rule of Simmons."
1. Murray v. State
The murky and shifting law of improper prosecutorial comment
has been further confused by recent opinions of the Florida Su-
preme Court. Reacting to what one district court described as a
"veritable torrent"81 of cases involving prosecutorial improprieties,
the district courts reversed an astonishing number of cases in
1982 2 and 1983."3 While this phenomenon has been discussed in
82. 375 U.S. 85 (1963). The precise test articulated by the Court was "whether there is a
reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the con-
viction." Id. at 86-87, quoted in Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23.
83. 386 U.S. at 24.
84. 195 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 1967).
85. 190 So. 756 (Fla. 1939).
86. Id at 551. Justice Thornal dissented and adhered to the Simmons rule. Id. at 551
(Thornal, J., dissenting).
87. 217 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1968).
88. FLA. STAT. § 924.33 (1985) provides:
No judgment shall be reversed unless the appellate court is of the opinion, after
an examination of all the appealed papers, that error was committed that injuri-
ously affected the substantial right of the appellant. It shall not be presumed that
error injuriously affected the substantial rights of the appellant.
89. 360 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 1978).
90. Id. at 763.
91. Jackson v. State, 421 So. 2d 15, 16 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
92. The year 1982 yielded at least nine reversals predicated upon improper prosecutorial
comment on the defendant's silence during closing argument, Simpson v. State, 418 So. 2d
984 (Fla. 1982); Cooper v. State, 413 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Wheeler v. State, 425
So. 2d 109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Collins v. State, 423 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Gomez
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greater depth previously, suffice it to say that there was great con-
cern that the district courts had overreacted to the problem.9
Prosecutors were being restricted beyond the requirements of Flor-
ida law, and the district courts were using reversal as the sanc-
tion.9 5 During this surge of cases, one district court took the un-
v. State, 415 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Ramos v. State, 413 So. 2d 1302 (Fla. 3d DCA
1982); McMillian v. State, 409 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (reversed for improper ques-
tioning by the prosecutor); Chapman v. State, 417 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Coleman
v. State, 420 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); as well as several close calls: Thomas v. State,
419 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 1982); Breedlove v. State, 413 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1982); Williams v. State,
425 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Westley v. State, 416 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982);
Nelson v. State, 416 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); Kindell v. State, 413 So. 2d 1283 (Fla.
3d DCA 1982).
93. The year 1983 had 22 reversals, Teffeteller v. State, 439 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1983) (sen-
tence vacated and remanded to trial court); Huff v. State, 437 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 1983);
Perdomo v. State, 439 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Robinson v. State, 438 So. 2d 8 (Fla.
5th DCA 1983); Bayshore v. State, 437 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Shepherd v. State,
436 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Salazar-Rodriguez v. State, 436 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 3d DCA
1983); Green v. State, 436 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Bullard v. State, 436 So. 2d 962
(Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Layton v. State, 435 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Kinchen v. State,
432 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Meade v. State, 431 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983);
Dixon v. State, 430 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Michaels v. State, 429 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1983), modified, 454 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 1984); Brazil v. State, 429 So. 2d 1339 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1983); Edwards v. State, 428 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Lipman v. State, 428 So.
2d 733 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Fernandez v. State, 427 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Brown
v. State, 427 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Green v. State, 427 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 3d DCA
1983); Murray v. State, 425 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Rahmings v. State, 425 So. 2d
1217 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); ten close calls, Darden v. Wainwright, 699 F.2d 1031 (11th Cir.
1983); Mason v. State, 438 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 1983); Harris v. State, 438 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 1983);
Harich v. State, 437 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1983); O'Callaghan v. State, 429 So. 2d 691 (Fla.
1983); Friddle v. State, 438 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Miller v. State, 438 So. 2d 1043
(Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Broomfield v. State, 436 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); McGee v.
State, 435 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Carr v. State, 430 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983);
and several other cases involving improper questioning, Bain v. State, 440 So. 2d 454 (Fla.
4th DCA 1983); Fussell v. State, 436 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Perez v. State, 434 So.
2d 347 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Dixon v. State, 426 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
94. See DeFoor, supra note 2, at 444-47.
95. One of the authors had occasion, at the height of the controversy, to participate in a
panel discussion on the subject of prosecutorial argument, convictions, and reversals at the
annual meeting of the Florida Prosecuting Attorney's Association held in Fort Pierce, Flor-
ida in September 1983. Panelists included Jerry M. Blair, State Attorney for the Third Cir-
cuit; J. Allison DeFoor II, Monroe County Judge; Harry Lee Anstead, Judge, Fourth District
Court of Appeal; Allen R. Schwartz, Chief Judge, Third District Court of Appeal; and Clif-
ford B. Sheppard, Jr., President-Elect, Florida Conference of Circuit Court Judges. The
panel discussion followed a one hour analysis from the prosecutor's point of view offered by
Ray Marky, Associate Attorney General.. Mr. Marky conceded that some prosecutorial
abuses had occurred, but engaged in analysis of cases in which he felt district courts had
exceeded the requirements of the law in reversing for such argument. Mr. Marky decried the
fact that he felt no similar restrictions were being placed on defense counsel and generally
asserted the point of view noted in the text. His concerns were supported in the case law. In
Meade v. State, 431 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 4th DCA), petition for review denied, 441 So. 2d 633
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precedented step of threatening to report an offending prosecutor
(Fla. 1983), the prosecutor's summation included the following statement which was not
objected to contemporaneously by defense counsel: "There, ladies and gentlemen, is a man
who forgot the fifth commandment, which was codified in the laws of the State of Florida
against murder: Thou shalt not kill." Id. at 1031. This statement was held reversible error,
despite the clear holding to the contrary of the Florida Supreme Court in Paramore v. State,
229 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 1969):
The reading of passages from the Bible is not ground for reversal. Counsel
should not be so restricted in argument as to prevent references by way of illustra-
tion to principles of divine law relating to transactions of men as may be appropri-
ate to the case. . . . This is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge ....
Id. at 860-61.
The court in Meade attempted to distinguish its holding by claiming that Paramore's
facts were not clear and that some killing is justified under Florida law. As to the first point,
Ray Marky, who handled Paramore on appeal, claimed in his speech that the prosecutor in
Paramore not only cited the same commandment, but in fact read it verbatim from the
Bible upon which the witnesses had been sworn. As to the latter, the question comes to
mind why this should not have been a point which defense counsel might have made, if
desired, in argument. Ironically, a modern translation of the commandment "Thou shalt not
kill" translates the prohibition as "Thou shalt do no murder." BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER
317-18 (Seabury Press 1979).
In Green v. State, 427 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 3d DCA), petition for review denied, 438 So. 2d
834 (Fla. 1983), a defense expert witness referred to the defendant as a "Dragon Lady." Id.
at 1038. The prosecutor revisited this theme in his summation. The district court reacted
strongly, characterizing the remarks as a sign of incompetence. Id.
It is difficult to understand the Green court's holding in light of rules concerning the
proper scope of argument. The supreme court has stated that, as long as argument is predi-
cated upon evidence in the case, Spencer v. State, 133 So. 2d 729, 731 (Fla. 1961), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 880 (1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 904 (1963), "[w]ide latitude is permitted
in arguing to a jury." Breedlove v. State, 413 So. 2d 1, 8 (Fla. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
882 (1982). The prosecutor is free to make logical inferences to support his theory of the
case. Id. at 8. The supreme court has held that these inferences can properly include the
"fanciful play of imagina[tion]." Gaston v. State, 184 So. 150, 151-52 (Fla. 1938).
In an earlier case, the Georgia Supreme Court stated poetically: "His illustrations may be
as various as are the resources of his genius; his argumentation as full and profound as his
learning can make it; and he may, if he will, give play to his wit or wing to his imagination."
Mitchum v. State, 11 Ga. 615, 631 (Ga. 1852), quoted in Washington v. State, 98 So. 605,
609 (Fla. 1932).
Generally speaking, the Florida Supreme Court has been slow to reverse for over-charac-
terization, or mere rhetoric. See, e.g., Breedlove, 413 So. 2d 1, 7 (Fla. 1982); Schneider v.
State, 152 So. 2d 731, 735 (Fla. 1963).
Finally, in the case of Murray v. State, 425 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), quashed and
remanded, 443 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 1984), the district court found the following statement suffi-
cient predicate for reversal, curiously on the theory that it constituted an injection of per-
sonal opinion:
I suggest to you, ladies and gentlemen, that here is a man who thinks he knows
the law; thinks he can twist and bend the law to his own advantage and lie to you
in court so that he is acquitted and not sent to prison as a result or otherwise
adjudicated in any fashion.
425 So. 2d at 158. It is difficult to understand how the remark may be seen as anything
other than a permissible comment upon the credibility of a defendant who took the stand. It
is even more difficult to fathom how a remark prefaced with "I suggest to you" is an injec-
tion of personal opinion, as opposed to a mere prefatory phrase. See Edwards v. State, 288
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to the Bar for discipline,9" and, in a subsequent case, carrying out
the threat."7
The high watermark of this trend of reversals was reached in
State v. Murray.s8 In Murray, the Florida Supreme Court reversed
a holding of the Fourth District that a prosecutor's attack on the
defendant's credibility constituted reversible error.99 The supreme
court quashed the district court's decision and ordered the trial
court's judgment reinstated. The court characterized the comments
in question as "excessively pungent,"100 but focused upon the
"overwhelming" evidence of the defendant's guilt 0 1 and noted that
the prosecutor had been admonished upon objection.102 The court
further stated that "prosecutorial error alone does not warrant au-
tomatic reversal of a conviction unless the errors involved are so
basic to a fair trial that they can never be treated as harmless."'' 3s
2. United States v. Hasting
The court in Murray expressly stated that it agreed with the
analysis of the United States Supreme Court in United States v.
Hasting," which involved a prosecutor's comment on the defend-
ants' silence during summation. 0 5 In reversing the convictions, 0
So. 2d 540 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974) (prosecutor's prefatory comment "I think" held not an ex-
pression of personal opinion sufficient to constitute prejudicial error). Federal courts gener-
ally allow reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. See, e.g., United States v.
Braithwaite, 709 F.2d 1450, 1456 (11th Cir. 1983).
96. Jackson v. State, 421 So. 2d 15, 17 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). The Jackson court noted
that other sanctions, such as stern judicial admonitions, repeated reversals, the threat of
discipline by superiors or, ideally, self-adherence to prosecutors' sworn oaths both of office
and to the Code of Professional Responsibility, had all failed. Id. at 16. The court served
notice that it was prepared to go to the extraordinary measure of analyzing each instance of
abuse and referring instances of abuse to the Florida Bar or seeking discipline directly in
circuit court. Id. at 17.
97. Molina v. State, 447 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), petition for review denied, 447
So. 2d 888 (Fla. 1984). In Molina, the district court found that the prosecutor almost exactly
replicated the error which had earlier predicated a reversal of the same case. "It quite
clearly appears from this record that the prosecutor deliberately set about to circumvent our
[holding] in Molina v. State, 406 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) . . . ." 447 So. 2d at 255
(Pearson, J., concurring).
98. 443 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 1984).
99. 425 So. 2d 157, 158 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), quashed and remanded, 443 So. 2d 955
(Fla. 1984).
100. 443 So. 2d at 957.
101. Id. at 956.
102. Id. at 957.
103. Id. at 956.
104. 461 U.S. 499 (1983).
105. Id. at 502. During summation, the prosecutor responded to an objection by stating:
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the Seventh Circuit in Hastings refused to apply the harmless er-
ror rule because it "would impermissibly compromise the clear
constitutional violation of the defendants' Fifth Amendment
rights.' 10 7 The Supreme Court assumed that, in reversing the trial
court, the court of appeals "was exercising its supervisory powers
to discipline . . . prosecutors"' 08 and saw the question presented it
as "whether . . . in a purported exercise of supervisory powers, a
reviewing court may ignore the harmless-error analysis of Chap-
man."109 The Court answered this question in the negative" ° and
reversed the court of appeals. The Court stressed that a federal
court's supervisory powers "are not to be exercised in a vacuum.
Rather, reversals of convictions under the court's supervisory
power must be approached 'with some caution,' and with a view
toward balancing the interests involved.""' The Court went on to
stress the factors it considered relevant and which were not fully
addressed by the court of appeals:
[The court of appeals) did not consider the trauma the victims of
these particularly heinous crimes would experience in a new trial,
forcing them to relive harrowing experiences now long past, or the
practical problems of retrying these sensitive issues more than
four years after the events." 2
The Court also suggested that better remedies than reversal exist
to deter improper prosecutorial comment,"' such as ordering the
"The defendants at no time ever challenged any of the rapes, whether or not that occurred,
any of the sodomies." Id.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens found the prosecutor's remarks free from error,
and that "[i]t is therefore unnecessary for this Court to consider the scope of the supervi-
sory power of the federal appellate courts .... " Id. at 512-13 (Stevens, J. concurring).
Chief Justice Burger, the author of the majority opinion in Hasting, made a curious com-
ment on Justice Stevens' point: "Justice Stevens may well be correct that the prosecutor's
argument was permissible comment. The question on which review was granted assumed
that there was error and the question to be resolved was whether harmless-error analysis
should have applied." Id. at 506 n.4.
106. United States v. Hastings, 660 F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1980), rev'd sub nom. United
States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983).
107. Id. at 303.
108. 461 U.S. at 505.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 506-07 (citations omitted).
112. Id. at 507.
113. Id. at 506 n.5. Here, for example, the court could have dealt with the offending
argument by directing the district court to order the prosecutor to show cause why he
should not be disciplined, see, e.g., SOUTHERN DisTmicr OF ILLINOIs RULE 33, or by asking the
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prosecutor to show cause why he should not be disciplined, or re-
ferring the matter to the Justice Department's Office of Profes-
sional Responsibility for investigation." 4
As to the nature of the error"5 that resulted from the prosecu-
tor's comment on the defendants' silence, the Court noted that
"the harmless-error rule governs even constitutional violations
under some circumstances . . . ."I Therefore, since the Court in
Chapman had "affirmatively rejected a per se rule . . ., it is the
duty of a reviewing court to consider the trial record as a whole
and to ignore errors that are harmless, including most constitu-
tional violations. . . ""17 Because the court of appeals in Hasting
failed to apply the harmless error rule,"' the Supreme Court
reversed." 9
Consequently, in the federal system, 20 before a court may re-
verse a conviction for a prosecutor's remarks on a defendant's right
to remain silent, the reviewing court must first review the whole
record to determine whether the error was harmless. If the review-
ing court is convinced that the error was harmless beyond a rea-
Department of Justice to initiate a disciplinary proceeding against him. During the year
1980, the Department of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, investigated 28 com-
plaints of unethical conduct and that one Assistant United States Attorney resigned in the
face of an investigation of allegedly improper arguments made to a grand jury. Brief for
Petitioner at 21 n.16, United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983). The court also could
have publicly chastised the prosecutor by identifying him in its opinion. See United States
v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1183-84 (2d Cir. 1981).
114. Hasting, 461 U.S. at 506 n.5.
115. As previously noted, there was some debate as to whether any error did in fact
exist. Id. at 502, 506, 512.
116. Id. at 508.
117. Id. at 508-09.
118. Id.
119. Based on an examination of the whole record which it had before it, the Court
applied the harmless error rule and determined "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
relied upon was harmless." Id. at 512. Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall would
have vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the court of appeals for application of
the harmless error test. Id. at 512 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 520, 523 (Brennan and
Marshall, JJ., dissenting in part).
120. As one would expect, the court of appeals in each of the circuits applies the harm-
less-error rule to comments on defendants' silence. See, e.g. United States v. Cox, 752 F.2d
741 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Singer, 732 F.2d 631 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Barton, 731 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v. Blanton, 730 F.2d 1425 (11th Cir.
1984); United States V. Monaghan, 741 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
1847 (1985); United States v. Shaw, 701 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1067
(1984); United States v. Rodriguez, 627 F.2d 110 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Parker,
549 F. 2d 1217 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 971 (1977); Berryman v. Colbert, 538 F.2d
1247 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Tillman, 470 F.2d 142 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
968 (1972); Leake v. Cox, 432 F.2d 982 (4th Cir. 1970); United States v. Nasta, 398 F.2d 283
(2d Cir. 1968).
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sonable doubt, the conviction should stand.
Having examined the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Hasting, the Florida Supreme Court in Murray articulated a stan-
dard of review requiring application of the harmless error rule
before a decision is reversed. The court noted that the district
court in Murray had focused solely upon the prosecutor's state-
ments and not on the evidence. 12 1 In this regard, the supreme court
reaffirmed longstanding principles of law in this area and reversed
a trend at the district court level which had gone too far.
The court indicated that reversal will be reserved for only the
most egregious cases 12 and inferred that, short of the harmful er-
ror standard, appellate courts still have a duty to disapprove im-
proper comments as a function of their supervisory powers.' 3 The
court followed the suggestion in Hasting and specifically approved
disciplinary action against offending prosecutors, "in appropriate
cases," as a remedy for prosecutorial misconduct." 4 What shall
constitute such an appropriate case remains undefined.
VI. CALL FOR CLARIFICATION
The Murray court's reliance, in dicta, on Hasting, generated
considerable confusion because Hasting involved an impermissible
comment upon the defendant's silence."25 The United States Su-
preme Court approved the application of the harmless error stan-
dard before reversal of such cases."12 The obvious question which
arose was whether the Florida Supreme Court had, by implication,
receded from a per se reversal rule on improper prosecutorial com-
ment on a defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent.
This was precisely the issue confronting the Fifth District in
Rowell v. State."7 In Rowell, the prosecutor's witness made the
comment reproduced at the beginning of this article"28 and the
state, citing both Hasting and Murray, argued that before reversal
can be ordered, the court must apply the harmless error doctrine.
The Rowell court noted that Murray did not deal directly with a
comment upon a defendant's silence; thus, the reliance upon Hast-




125. 461 U.S. at 507-09.
126. Id.
127. 450 So. 2d 1226 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984).
128. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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ing in the Murray decision constituted dicta.129 The court went on
to note that subsequent to Murray, the Florida Supreme Court in
State v. Strasser13 0 had relied upon pre-Murray law in reaffirming
the per se rule of reversal for improper comment upon a defend-
ant's right to remain silent.1 3' The Rowell court indicated its pref-
erence for the Hasting rule and made the reference to the "acrid
and familiar comment on the law by Mr. Bumble in Oliver Twist"
to explain these seemingly contrary results. 3 2 The Fifth District
then certified the following question as one of great public
importance:
Has the Florida Supreme Court, by its agreement in State v.
Murray. . . with the analysis of the supervisory powers of appel-
late courts as related to the harmless error rule as set forth in
United States v. Hasting . . . receded by implication from the
per se rule of reversal explicated in Donovan v. State . . .? s3
Similar questions were subsequently certified on five separate oc-
casions by three district courts of appeal.'13
129. Rowell, 450 So. 2d at 1228.
130. 445 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 1984).
131. Rowell, 450 So. 2d at 1228. The Rowell court held:
Despite our agreement with the logic of Hasting and our reservations in regard to
the justice of a per se rule, we are bound at this point in time to adhere to Ben-
nett and Donovan. . . . This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that in the re-
cent case of State v. Strasser, 445 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 1984), released a month after
the opinion issued in Murray, the Florida Supreme Court relied on its prior deci-
sion in State v. Burwick, 442 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 1983), which was issued a month
before Murray. In Burwick, it was held to be reversible error to admit evidence at
trial that a defendant had intelligently exercised his constitutional right to silence
after Miranda warnings in the state's effort to rebut his insanity defense. The
Florida Supreme Court recognized the per se rule in Burwick, stating: "There is
no dispute that it is reversible error for the prosecution to attempt to impeach a
defendant's alibi testimony by asking on cross-examination why he remained si-
lent at the time of his arrest." 442 So. 2d at 947. Two United States Supreme
Court cases are cited in Burwick: Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), and United
States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975). Doyle is irrelevant in regard to the applicabil-
ity of the harmless error rule; it expressly notes that issue was not raised. Hale did
not approve a per se rule but confined its holding to the circumstances of that
particular case and an express finding of prejudice. Neither Burwick nor Strasser
refers to Hasting.
Id.
132. Rowell, 450 So. 2d at 1228.
133. Id. (citations omitted).
134. Grissom v. State, 469 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Burns v. State, 466 So. 2d
1207 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Marshall v. State, 473 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); Crawford
v. State, 473 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); Knox v. State, 471 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 4th DCA
1985); Barry v. State, 467 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985).
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VII. FLORIDA SUPREME COURT REJECTS PER SE REVERSAL RULE
With the stage thus set, the Florida Supreme Court had to de-
cide whether it would recede from the per se reversal rule. The
court at first skirted the issue, then faced it squarely.
A. Bertolotti v. State
In Bertolotti, 5s the supreme court reviewed improper argument
in the penalty phase of a murder trial.136 The court expressed con-
cern over the continuing trend of misconduct in this areal"7 and
that the harmless error doctrine might encourage prosecutors to
believe that such actions could be taken without repercussion. " '
The court again stressed that sanctions should be directed at the
offending prosecutor and not at the citizenry: "[I]t is appropriate
that individual professional misconduct not be punished at the cit-
izens' expense, by reversal and mistrial, but at the attorney's ex-
pense, by professional sanction."18 9 The court also stressed the role
of the trial court in acting swiftly to curb and correct such
abuse.10
B. The Question Resolved: State v. DiGuilio4
The very next week, despite the mild misgivings expressed in
Bertolotti that the harmless error rule might have a tendency to
encourage misconduct, the Florida Supreme Court in State v.
DiGuilio"2 fully and squarely rejected the per se reversal rule for
comments directed to a defendant's silence. In so doing, the court
added yet another chapter to Florida's long history of judicial vac-
135. Bertolotti v. State, 476 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1985).
136. The court found present in the prosecutor's closing argument both the forbidden
"Golden Rule" argument and an improper attempt to inflame the jury. Id. at 133.
137. "[W~e are deeply disturbed as a Court by the continuing violations of prosecutorial
duty, propriety and restraint." Id.
138. "Nor may we encourage them to believe that so long as their misconduct can be
characterized as "harmless error," it will be without repercussion." Id.
139. Id. at 133-34.
140. Id. at 134.
Moreover, we commend to trial judges the vigilant exercise of their responsibil-
ity to insure a fair trial. Where, as here, prosecutorial misconduct is properly
raised on objection, the judge should sustain the objection, give any curative in-
struction that may be proper and admonish the prosecutor and call to his atten-
tion his professional duty and standards of behavior. Id.




illation on this point.
The court in DiGuilio described the history of Florida's per se
rule in cases involving prosecutorial comment on a defendant's
fifth amendment right as "long and consistent, 1 4 although that
was hardly the case.144 Justice McDonald, writing for the court,
placed great reliance upon the rationale of the federal position ex-
pressed in Chapman 45 and Hasting46 and further noted the exis-
tence of Florida's statutory harmless error provisions.1 4 7
The court then suggested that Florida's per se reversal rule was
based upon an incorrect belief that federal standards dictated this
result: "We did not apply [the harmless error rule] to comments on
silence previously because we believed, under Miranda, that the
federal constitution required automatic reversal."148
This analysis ignores the longer history of the rule, 4 9 including
its early adoption on independent state grounds, although doubt-
less the seemingly impregnable status of the Miranda rule led to
the per se rule's longevity. The DiGuilio court, after noting that all
fifty states and the federal courts had some variation of the harm-
less error rule,1 50 which "promotes the administration of justice," '
noted that "[iut makes no sense to burden our legal system with a
new trial when the result will be the same. 1 L5 2
Although reiterating the fact that such comment constitutes er-
ror,1 53 the court articulated the standard for appellate reversal as
whether "[a]bsent the comment on silence, is it clear beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the jury would have returned a verdict of
guilty?"' The court then concluded that the federal standard was
143. 10 Fla. L.W. at 431.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 58-63, 84-90. The court incorrectly traced its
origin to the 1967 case of Jones v. State, 200 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967).
145. 10 Fla. L.W. at 432; see Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
146. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983).
147. "Florida has had a harmless error statute for some time now in both civil and crimi-
nal proceedings. §§ 49.041, 924.33 FLA. STAT. (1983)." DiGuilio, 10 Fla. L.W. at 431.
148. 10 Fla. L.W. at 431.
149. The historical background of the independence of the states to interpret their anal-
ogous constitutional provisions was recognized in the case of Florida v. Kinchen, 10 Fla.
L.W. 446, 447 (Fla. Aug. 30, 1985) (Ehrlich, J., dissenting).
150. DiGuilio, 10 Fla. L.W. at 432.
151. Id. (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22; Hasting, 461 U.S. at 508). The court stated
that "[a]ll of these rules, state or federal, serve a very useful purpose insofar as they block
setting aside convictions for small errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of
having changed the result of the trial." 10 Fla. L.W. at 432.
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"more reasonable" than the former Florida rule. 185 The rejection of
the per se rule was underscored the very next day in two opinions
reaching the same conclusion. 15e
VIII. CONCLUSION
Although its analysis of the legal history is flawed, the Florida
Supreme Court in State v. DiGuilio has resolved ambiguity in the
application of the harmless error rule to improper prosecutorial
comment on a defendant's right to remain silent. All improper
prosecutorial comments, whether made in the federal or Florida
courts, are now subject to the same harmless error test and a "be-
yond a reasonable doubt" standard. 157 The adoption of the harm-
less error rule is a desirable result both in terms of reconciling the
federal and state standards and, more importantly, in reducing the
number of occasions when society, victims, and witnesses are sub-
jected to the abuse inherent in a retrial.
The Florida courts have concluded that contemporaneous objec-
tion is required to preserve the issue of improper prosecutorial
comment for appeal. The preliminary issue of what constitutes an
impermissible comment has been mooted for the most part by the
adoption of the harmless error standard. Only the determination of
the propriety of the subtle remark about a defendant's silence will
cause courts difficulty. Clearly prejudicial remarks are normally
deemed impermissible. Because subtle comments are far less likely
to rise above the level of harmless error, it usually will be unneces-
sary for courts to reach the more difficult issue of impermissibility.
155. Id. In keeping with the concerns he had previously expressed in this area, Justice
Adkins dissented. Id. (Adkins, J., dissenting).
156. State v. Marshall, 476 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 1985); State v. Kinchen, 10 Fla. L.W. 446
(Fla. August 30, 1985), petition for reh'g filed, No. 64, 043 (Fla. Sept. 16, 1985).
157. We now adopt the harmless error rule. Any comment on, or which is fairly
susceptible of being interpreted as referring to, a defendant's failure to testify is
error and is strongly discouraged. Such a comment, however, should be evaluated
according to the harmless error rule, with the state having the burden of showing
the comment to have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Only if the state
fails to carry this burden should an appellate court reverse an otherwise valid
conviction.
Marshall, 476 So.2d at 153.
